To better understand the relationship between different types of firm ownership and management turnover, this study classifies ownership along two dimensions: the type of owner and the concentration of ownership. Within this framework, a unique data set is used to study the impact of management turnover on a company's performance. This study, in addition to confirming some of the results from previous studies, includes interesting and important new results. Most importantly, it finds evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is weaker in statecontrolled firms than in non-state firms, and varies according to different subtypes of private ownership. We also demonstrate that the turnover-performance relationship is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but that this relationship moves in opposite directions under state and private ownership. Important policy implications of these findings are discussed.
Introduction
In public corporations, there are two common agency problems: (1) the classic owner-manager agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and management, as described in Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) ;
and (2) the agency problem as a result of the different interests of large controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, referred to as "tunneling" (Johnson et al., 2000; Bebchuk, 1999; La Porta et al. 1998 , 2000b . Both the type of ownership -whether state, private, or family -and the size of the ownership stake have significant implications for agency problems. For example, the owner-manager agency problem is thought to be more severe in state-owned companies (SOEs) than in private companies. This is because the owner, in this case "the state", may have objectives other than profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishney, 1999; Shleifer 1998; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Laffont and Tirole 1993) . The state may also, as a result of diffused ownership, lack incentives either to motivate or discipline managers (Shleifer, 1998; Megginson and Netter, 2001) . The extent of tunneling may also be more prevalent in state-controlled companies because the state is able to use political power to secure its interest in ways that may hurt the interests of small shareholders. When it comes to private ownership, family shareholders and bank or corporate shareholders, may face different agency problems. Individuals or families may have greater incentives to monitor managers, which mitigates the managerial incentive problem. However, they may also be more likely to expropriate non-family shareholders, thus intensifying the problem of tunneling. Amit, 2006, 2009) . In addition to the type of ownership, the size of the ownership stake is relevant to the formation of agency problems. A large ownership stake implies greater incentives for both monitoring managers and expropriating small investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al. 1998 , 2000a .
Many empirical studies have examined the effect of ownership type and concentration on corporate governance behavior, financial performance, and firm value.
However, these studies have focused either on ownership type (such as state versus private ownership) or on concentrated ownership. Our study adopts a new framework and makes use of a unique data set of China's listed companies. In our two-by-two framework, the four categories of firms are defined as follows: Type I consists of firms in which the state is the largest owner and ownership is concentrated. If there is no private ownership in the firm, the firm has a hundred percent state ownership. This is the case for traditional SOEs. Type II consists of firms in which a private investor is the largest owner and ownership is concentrated. Type III consists of firms in which the state is the largest owner, but the absolute size of state ownership is relatively small.
Type IV consists of firms in which a private investor is the largest owner and ownership is relatively dispersed. There may be fundamental differences between these four groups in terms of industry, size, and other firm characteristics. In the study, we provide summary information and control for firm characteristics in the regression analysis.
Using this new more general framework, we can study the effect of state ownership by comparing firms in categories 1 and 3 with those in categories 2 and 4. At the same time,
we can examine the effect of concentrated ownership, distinguishing between those cases where the largest owner is the state and those where it is a private investor by comparing firms in categories 1 and 2 with those in categories 3 and 4.
Our study confirms the finding that the link between management turnover and firm performance is weaker in state-controlled than in privately controlled companies,
given a similar level of controlling shares. We interpret this result as the indication of the weaker monitoring effect in state-controlled firms. In addition, we find that the size of the ownership stake does matter. The relationship between ownership concentration and turnover-performance sensitivity is inversely U-shaped when the largest shareholder is a private investor; this supports the entrenchment effect under large ownership. This finding is similar to the concentration-performance relationship found by Morck et al. (1988) . Based on our estimates, entrenchment may be an even more serious problem when the largest owner is the state. We also find that the turnover-performance sensitivity differs across various subtypes of private ownership. Family ownership, for example, is associated with a significantly lower executive turnover rate and a weaker CEO turnover-performance link.
The results and insights obtained from our study not only contribute to the literature studying the impact of ownership on the sensitivity of management turnover to performance but also have great practical significance. It is worth noting that most national economies in today's world display significant state ownership in some important sectors. In recent years, however, such state ownership is more likely to take a new and flexible form. China is a major example of a country where the state is either the majority or a minority owner of newly incorporated SOEs. Incorporation of SOEs has also taken place in Australia under the policy of New Public Management (Wettenhall, 2001 ). Some scholars, Bardham and Roemer (1992) being the most prominent, believe that dominance of state ownership in new and flexible forms is a viable and necessary foundation for an efficient and equitable economy. Our study casts doubt on this belief.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant research and explains the difference between our study and previous studies. Section 3 summarizes China's experience in SOE reform to provide the institutional background for this study.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics and the regression results. Finally, section 6 discusses the policy implications of our findings and summarizes the paper.
Literature Review
Agency theories suggest that different ownership structures lead to different corporate governance behaviors, financial performance, and firm value, facts which have been supported by a large body of empirical literature. With respect to state ownership, empirical studies find that private companies are significantly more profitable than SOEs (Mengistae and Xu, 2004; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; La Porta et al., 2000; Tian, 2000; Ehrlich et al., 1994; Vining and Boardman, 1992; Boardman and Vining, 1989) .
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This finding confirms the agency theory that SOEs may be less effective than private companies in terms of corporate governance and managerial incentives.
When it comes to large ownership and tunneling, there are no direct quantitative measures. Nevertheless, since the controlling shareholder is more likely to expropriate small investors in countries with weak legal systems, some authors have used the degree of emphasis of the legal system on protecting small investors as the measure of the degree of tunneling and have found evidence that the legal system affects both dividend policies and firm value (La Porta et al., 2000a . Others have considered the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights as a proxy for the likelihood of expropriation, and have investigated various control-enhancing mechanisms used by the large shareholder, finding that these measures do impact dividend policy, firm valuation, and profitability (Cheung et al., 2006; Baek et al., 2004; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Joh, 2003; Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio, et al., 2001) .
One important measure of corporate governance effectiveness is the sensitivity of executive turnover to performance. Table 1 provides the summary of data, methodology, and main findings of the studies concerning the effect of ownership on the turnoverperformance link. Some authors such as Kaplan (1994) and Franks and Mayer (2001) find that the turnover-performance link has little relation to ownership concentration or owner type, attributing this finding to the offset between monitoring and the entrenchment effects of ownership. Others find that ownership types and concentration do matter. Denis et al. (1997) and Volpin (2002) show that managerial ownership and control weaken the turnover-performance link, supporting the entrenchment effect.
However, the increased ownership stake of the controlling shareholder strengthens the link, which is evidence of greater monitoring benefit from ownership concentration (Volpin, 2002) . Using Chinese data, studies generally find that state ownership, especially direct government ownership, is associated with weaker disciplining of managers, which confirms the prediction of the agency theory (Groves et al., 1995; Aivazian et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2006) . There is relatively little evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on the performance-turnover sensitivity in China. The exception is Kato and Long (2006) who find some evidence in favor of the positive effect of concentrated private shareholding for Chinese firms.
Most of the papers cited in Table 1 have separately studied the effect of state versus private ownership and the effect of concentrated ownership on turnover. A distinctive feature of our study is that it classifies all firms simultaneously along two dimensions of ownership, i.e., state vis-à-vis private ownership (the "who" or "type" dimension) and that of concentrated vis-à-vis dispersed ownership (the "how much" dimension). This creates a two-by-two framework allowing us to study some traditional questions of interest from new angles and also new questions that have not been studied before, as we will further explain soon.
3.
State enterprise reform in China.
China started to reform its SOEs in the late 1970s with the inception of economic reform. In the 1980s, the effort focused mainly on providing better incentives to SOE managers (see Groves et al., 1994 Groves et al., , 1995 . In the 1990s, to deepen the reforms, a greater effort was made towards restructuring SOE governance (Qian, 1996 (Qian, , 2000 
Data and Variables
The data in the study are based on the financial statements of companies listed on China's two stock exchanges and stored in the Tsinghua Financial Database (THFD)
developed by the China Center for Financial Research at Tsinghua University. These data are ideal for our study as China's strategy to reform its inefficient SOEs is akin to a controlled experiment. The essence of this strategy is to avoid massive privatization, and instead to try and make SOEs more efficient by incorporating them, introducing managerial incentives, and mimicking the governance structure of publicly traded companies in mature market economies in the West. While a significant level of state ownership in the economy is maintained, especially in sectors deemed critical for national interests, investment in SOEs by foreign or domestic private investors of various sizes is allowed. This has transformed China into an economy in which firms with exclusive state ownership, exclusive private ownership and those with mixed state and private ownership, coexist side by side, each making up a significant portion of the economy. Furthermore, we are able to compare the governance structure of listed companies with different ownership types due to the legal requirements imposed by the Government and its supervisory agency, the Chinese Security Regulation Committee (CSRC). Thus differences in executive turnover are more directly attributable to ownership than to specific features of corporate governance.
The dataset used here comprises complete information on a company from the year it was listed to the year it was delisted, or 2005 whichever date is later. Thus the data are an unbalanced panel, consisting, on average, of five years' of data for 1500 companies. For individual companies, the number of years listed ranges from 1-16.
Financial performance variables included comprise total sales, total assets, and profit before taxes, return to assets, and annual return to stock.
There are two measures of executive turnover: the turnover of board directors and that of CEOs. Director turnover is measured by the taking, as a percentage, the number of directors of the total number at the beginning of the year who experienced involuntary turnover in that year, i.e., who left the board for reasons other than illness, retirement, death, or resignation. We also consider leaving the board at the completion of a term as The dataset has three ownership variables: the largest owner of a company, the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner, and the total percentage of shares owned by different kinds of owners. The largest shareholder may be a government 7 Since involuntary turnover may be more difficult to observe in state-owned companies than in other companies, we have also carried out the analysis using all turnovers. CSRC requires that listed companies report CEO changes. If a CEO changes, we code turnover to be one. We exclude the very few cases where the CEO is clearly indicated to be dead and a new CEO takes over. The results are similar.
agency, e.g., the Ministry of Finance and SASAC, which directly control the listed company. In these cases, we have coded the largest shareholder as "the state".
Increasingly, the Government controls the listed company through an unlisted state corporation which it fully or predominantly owns and controls. The state corporation then owns a large block of the stock of the listed company and controls it. In such cases, the state corporation is documented as the largest shareholder of the listed company. In a few other cases, the largest shareholder is a public institute such as a university or research institute. In China, these institutes are publicly funded and owned by the state. This is, therefore, another form of state ownership.
For some other listed companies, an individual is listed as the largest shareholder.
Where family members hold shares of a listed company, we calculate the total shares Exchange. In these cases, the largest shareholder is coded as "foreign".
The most common non-state owner is a private company (unlisted), often known as the "mother" company of the listed company. The primary objective of this study is to examine the differences between stateand non-state ownership in terms of the relationship between executive turnover and performance. We also examine whether there are differences between sub-types of ownership. Therefore, we first group the six kinds of owners into two broad categories:
state and non-state. The largest owner is deemed to be the "state" if it consists of a government agency, SASAC, a state corporate, or a public institute. It is considered to be "non-state" if it is a private company, a family or individual, or a foreign company. Then, based on the nature and shares of the largest owner, we create four dummy variables:
Type I: Companies with a large ownership stake controlled by the state, i.e., the largest owner = the state, and the shares of the largest owner ≧25%;
Type II: Companies with the large ownership controlled by a non-state investor, i.e., the largest owner = non-state, and the shares of the largest owner ≧25%;
Type III: Dispersed shareholding with the state as the largest shareholder, i.e., the largest owner = the state, and the shares of the largest owner < 25%;
Type IV: Dispersed shareholding with a non-state investor as the largest shareholder,
i.e., the largest owner = non-state, and the shares of the largest owner < 25%.
Different cut-off levels are used to define concentrated shareholding, specifically 50%, 33%, and 25%. 10 Over time, a firm may switch types. If this switch is triggered by performance, the classification of a company by ownership into one of the four categories is endogenous. An examination of the data reveals that a change of categories is not frequent. Of 12549 company-year observations, only 1.82 percent or 228 had moved from Type I to Type III, which is the most common kind of move (Figure 1 ). The second most frequent move is from Type III to Type IV. Generally speaking, however, the listed companies remain in their ownership categories.
In order to ascertain the impact on a company of switching from one ownership type to another, we calculate the average profit in the three years leading to this switch and that after the switch, and test whether the difference is significant using t-tests of mean differences. To make the result more informative, we use industry-adjusted profit to measure performance, with industry-adjusted profit calculated as percentage differences between the firm's profit and the industry average level of profit weighted by the assets.
Industry information is provided by the Standard Classification of Industries of the CSRC.
The result is also reported in Figure 1 . It suggests that the change in performance after switching ownership types varies across firms, and there is no clear evidence that this switching is associated with increased performance. A calculation of the change in performance from one year before switching to one year after switching found similar results. Neither is switching ownership necessarily triggered by performance. Future research will be needed to determine why a firms change ownership types, and how these changes affect performance.
The four groups of firms (as defined above) may differ significantly in terms of size, industry, and other characteristics. Table 4 shows that state-controlled companies tend to be larger when measured either by total assets or annual sales. Based on the Chi2 test, there are also significant differences between the four groups in terms of industry.
The state-controlled firms are more likely to be in utility industries generally considered monopolistic and having a higher profit level. There is also a relatively high percentage of state-controlled firms in the manufacturing, construction, wholesale, retail, finance and insurance, and social service sectors. Interestingly, however, in manufacturing and construction, the state tends to hold a large share block (over 50 percent) whereas in the wholesale, retail, finance and insurance, and social service industries, while the state remains the largest shareholder, it has a smaller ownership stake. Non-state controlled firms, in contrast, are more likely to be found in the information technology, real estate, media and entertainment industries. Table 4 also shows differences in CEO characteristics between the four groups.
CEOs in state companies tend to be older and are less likely to have post-college education, but also less likely to be educated to junior high level or lower. This description seems to fit the profile of most CEOs in large state-controlled companies. In addition, CEOs in state-controlled companies are more likely to be selected from within the system of state enterprises and agencies in the related industry (McNally, 2002) . They enter the system after graduating from college and work their way up to executive or equivalent positions in the bureau, and thus tend to be older and have similar educational attainments. In contrast, CEOs of private listed companies are more likely to be company founders being either highly educated founders of high-tech companies, or educated to a lower level but highly able and motivated participants in traditional industries (Djankov, Qian, Roland, Zhuravskaya, 2006) .
Main Results

Descriptive Results
In this section, we provide some initial evidence of performance and executive turnover of the four groups of companies. As can be seen in 11 Both CEO and director turnover rate differences between companies are statistically significant.
Regression Results
In the regression model, Type I, Type II, Type III, and Type IV, indicate the four groups of firms defined as above. Type IV is used as the base group for comparison. The model is specified as follows: The CEO turnover rate calculated here is lower than that of Firth et al. (2006a) and Kato and Long (2006) . Kato and Long (2006) documented the average 24 percent of CEO turnover rate. Firth et al. (2006a) estimated an average turnover rate of chairmen of the board of 45 percent with 20 percent was "forced."
We use a much longer panel data than these two studies. In earlier years, executive turnover was less common. Also, we use a more restrictive definition of involuntary turnover. Both factors lead to the estimated lower turnover rates.
Industries. Explanatory variables include dummy variables of the three company groups and the interaction of the four group dummies with performance. Our main interest was in the coefficient estimates of the four interaction variables. These suggest how executive turnover changes in line with the company's performance in the four kinds of companies.
The estimates are generally expected to have a negative sign, suggesting reduced executive turnover with better performance. However, the size of the estimates may differ across groups. F-tests were conducted to test whether these estimates are significantly different across groups. Control variables in the model included the size of the company with size approximated by a natural logarithm of total assets, and sales growth. Year dummies were also included to control for all time-specific factors such as the business cycle. In the CEO turnover estimation, CEO's personal characteristics such as age, gender, party membership, education attainment, and job tenure were also included as additional control variables.
In another variation, the model is specified as follows:
The main feature of model 2 is the inclusion of sharepct to measure continuous changes in shareholding. performance, then we will find the smaller negative or positive estimate of ϕ . In the U.S.
context, Amit (2006, 2009) show that the family uses various mechanisms to enhance the control over the firm, with these having different impacts on firm value.
They also find that the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders of the firm (the entrenchment effect) is highly relevant, although the owner-manager agency problem (the managerial incentive issue) may be reduced in family firms. The estimates of equation (3) would show whether these hypotheses concerning family ownership are also supported in China. 
As checks for robustness, we utilized the panel data to estimate the fixed effect specification of the above models. The cross-sectional model was estimated with both within-and across-company variation. The effect of performance on executive turnover is identified by comparing turnover in two companies with different performance as well as turnover in the same company in different years. In contrast, only the within-company variation is used to estimate the fixed effect model. The fixed effect estimates are reported along with the cross-sectional estimates.
We have also estimated equations (1) to (3), using several alternative measures of ownership and performance. First, different cut-off levels are employed to classify the Type I, Type II, Type III, and Type IV firms, specifically, 50%, 33%, and 25%. The results are reported in Table 5A , 5B, and 5C respectively. Second, instead of making state ownership equal one if the largest shareholder is the state, we let state ownership equal one if there is any state share in a company, i.e. when it is greater than zero. Similarly, by interacting with shares held, we create the four group dummies. Third, we estimate the models using absolute profit rather than industry-adjusted profit, but at the same time control for industry dummies. In the fourth instance, the models are estimated with twoand three-year lag pre-tax profit and other performance variables such as annual return to stock and return to assets. The results are similar to those that have been reported in this paper.
12 Tables 5A, 5B , and 5C show the estimates of model (1) Kato and Long (2006) . Nevertheless, since the effect of concentrated ownership may be curvilinear and further analysis is needed.
In Table 6 , we show the effect of state vis-à-vis non-state ownership on executive turnover allowing for continuous effect of concentrated ownership (Model 2). The results suggest that shareholding concentration has a different impact on the performanceturnover sensitivity under state and private ownership. Under private ownership, the presence of block holding enhanced the performance-turnover link but the effect was curvilinear, suggesting an inverse U-shaped relationship between control effectiveness and the private ownership concentration. This result is consistent with Morck et al. (1988 Morck et al. ( , 2005 who argued that the entrenchment effect may become greater than the monitoring effect when private ownership becomes overly concentrated. Under state ownership, increased shareholding leads to less sensitive CEO turnover to performance, and that the director turnover results are similar to those seen under non-state ownership but are much weaker. Taken together, this finding suggests the entrenchment effect may be greater when the largest owner is the state.
The differences between state and private ownership in terms of the entrenchment and managerial disciplining effects may be caused by some subtype of private ownership, such as family ownership. To test this hypothesis, we estimated equation (3) and report the results in Table 7 . The OLS estimates show that family ownership is associated with lower director and CEO turnover than state ownership. When the largest owner is a private corporation, executive turnover rates are fairly high. Foreign ownership has a negative impact on director turnover but an insignificant impact on CEO turnover. The fixed effect estimates are not as strong as the OLS results, but the pattern is similar.
Overall, the results suggest that different subtypes of private ownership have distinct executive turnover rates. In family owned and controlled firms, executive turnover is rather low.
It is unclear whether executive turnover is less sensitive to performance in familycontrolled firms. Table 7 suggests that director turnover may be sensitive to performance in family-controlled listed companies but CEO turnover in such family firms is the least sensitive to performance of all the firms types examined here. These results are understandable since the CEO in a family firm is often a family member, whereas the turnover of non-family directors may be highly sensitive to performance.
Summary and Conclusion
Adopting a new and more general framework and using a unique data set, we have more thoroughly examined the effect of state versus private ownership and concentrated versus dispersed ownership on the sensitivity of executive turnover to a company's performance. With regard to private ownership, our study suggests that various subtypes of private ownership differ in their executive turnover rates and in the sensitivity of executive turnover to performance. With regard to state ownership, our study suggests that the turnover-performance link is weaker, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance further declines as ownership becomes more concentrated, while the opposite is true in private firms.
In conclusion, there are significant differences between state and private ownership in terms of managerial discipline and entrenchment, and there are also important differences between subtypes of private ownership, such as that between family and private corporate shareholding. Kaplan (1994) The sample consists of 61 German firms taken from the Fortune Magazine's list of 500 largest foreign companies in 1980.
Neither concentrated ownership nor different ownership types, e.g. bank control, family or managerial ownership, is significantly related to the turnover-performance link.
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997)
The sample consists of 5545 firm-year observations over the period of 1985-1988, involving 1394 U.S. firms selected from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Managerial ownership weakens the sensitivity of CEO turnover to stock price performance.
Franks and Mayer (2001)
The sample consists of 75 quoted industrial and commercial firms collected from Hoppenstedt Stockguide in 1990.
Ownership concentration or the type of concentrated owner does not affect the turnover-performance link.
Volpin (2002) The sample contains the total of 205 Italian firms and 1611 firm-year observations over the period of 1986-1997. The data are collected from several issues of ''Il Taccuino dell'Azionista''.
Concentrated ownership and family ownership increase the sensitivity of top executive turnover to performance if the controlling shareholder or the family owner is not on the executive board. The turnover-performance link is also stronger when the controlling shareholder also owns a large stake in the firm.
Studies in China
Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1995) The sample consists of 769 SOEs surveyed in four provinces during the period of 1980-1989.
The economic reform led to the stronger turnoverperformance relations in SOEs. Managers could be, and were, fired in response to poor performance.
Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005) The sample contains 432 SOEs from four provinces during the period of 1994-1999. The data are collected from the Enterprise Survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2000.
Incorporation of SOEs strengthens the link between management turnover and performance. Management turnover is more sensitive to performance in incorporated SOEs than in those never incorporated. Chairman turnover is more sensitive to performance in the firms controlled by legal entities than in those controlled by the state. Foreign ownership has an insignificant impact on either turnover or turnoverperformance sensitivity. Kato and Long (2006) The sample consists of 638 Chinese listed companies and the total of 2181 firm-year observations during 1999-2002.
CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock returns in private companies than in state-controlled companies. Ownership concentration is associated with the stronger turnover-performance link when the largest owner is private. the limited number of companies, summary statistics prior to 1993 were not reported. In parenthesis is the percentage of companies with the state being the largest shareholder among those that have a large share block of at least 25, 50, or 75%. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Number of observations 3688 874 4047 2327 Note: Director turnover indicates the average percentage of directors being displaced per year of all the firms. CEO turnover indicates the percentage of companies with CEO being displaced in a year. *, **, and *** indicate the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance level for t-tests of mean differences between type I and the rest firms. The total number of company-year observations drops to 10936 due to the use of lag-values in calculating sales growth. Some CEO characteristics variables have missing values, so the total number of observations used in the CEO characteristics summary is 9617. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Note: Type I refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns 50% or more shares; Type II refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns 50% or more shares; Type III refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns less than 50% shares; Type IV refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns less than 50% shares. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. CEO characteristics include CEO's age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status. The total number of firm-year observations used in director turnover regressions is 10936 due to the use of lag-values. Because of the missing values in CEO characteristics variables, the total number of firm-year observations further drops to 9617 in CEO turnover regressions. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Note: Type I refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns 33% or more shares; Type II refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns 33% or more shares; Type III refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns less than 33% shares; Type IV refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns less than 33% shares. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. CEO characteristics include CEO's age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status. The total number of firm-year observations used in director turnover regressions is 10936 due to the use of lag-values. Because of the missing values in CEO characteristics variables, the total number of firm-year observations further drops to 9617 in CEO turnover regressions. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Note: Type I refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns 25% or more shares; Type II refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns 25% or more shares; Type III refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns less than 25% shares; Type IV refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns less than 25% shares. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. CEO characteristics include CEO's age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status. The total number of firm-year observations used in director turnover regressions is 10936 due to the use of lag-values. Because of the missing values in CEO characteristics variables, the total number of firm-year observations further drops to 9617 in CEO turnover regressions. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Note: State share percentage equals the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder when the largest shareholder is the state. Non-state share percentage equals the percentage of shares held by the largest owner when the largest owner is non-state. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. CEO characteristics include CEO's age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status. The total number of firm-year observations used in director turnover regressions is 10936 due to the use of lag-values. Because of the missing values in CEO characteristics variables, the total number of firmyear observations further drops to 9617 in CEO turnover regressions. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data. Note: State, family, foreign, and private Co. denotes the largest shareholder being the state, a family, a foreign company or individual, or a Chinese private company. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. For the CEO turnover, the coefficient estimates of linear probability model with White-corrected standard errors are reported. CEO characteristics include CEO's age, gender, education, job tenure, and party membership status. The total number of firm-year observations used in director turnover regressions is 10936 due to the use of lag-values. Because of the missing values in CEO characteristics variables, the total number of firmyear observations further drops to 9617 in CEO turnover regressions. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data.
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Figure 1: Switching Ownership Types
Note: Type I refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns 50% or more shares; Type II refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns 50% or more shares; Type III refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is the state and the largest shareholder owns less than 50% shares; Type IV refers to the firms whose largest shareholder is non-state and the largest shareholder owns less than 50% shares. The number outside the parenthesis indicates the percentage of observations switching types following the arrow's direction. The number in the parenthesis indicates the change in the industry-adjusted profit after switching. *, **, and *** indicates that the change in the industry-adjusted profit after switching is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level based on the t-test of mean differences. Industry-adjusted profit is the percentage difference between the firm's pre-tax profit and the asset-weighted industry-average pre-tax profit. Source: Authors' calculations using THFD data.
